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Maintenance of an adequate national defense seems to be regarded as a fundamental
governmental policy. A citizen "may be compelled-against his will and without re-
gard to his religious convictions to take his place in the ranks of the army of his coun-
try and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense." Jacobson v. Mass., 197
U.S. I, 29 (1905); cf. U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) and U.S. v. Mcintosh,
283 U.S. 605 (1931) (denying citizenship to aliens who, because of religious belief, re-
fused to take the oath to defend the nation).
In view of the above cases and the fact that the plaintiffs were neither compelled to
go to the state university nor required to enter military service upon the completion of
the course, the court felt that the infringement on religious liberty was not as great as
others previously held constitutional. A desire for less restricted religious freedom and
doubt as to the desirability of military training is reflected in popular criticism of the
case. 51 Christian Century 1651 (i934); 52 Christian Century 8 (,935).. But cf. 81
New Republic 113 (1934); Literary Digest, Dec. 15, p. 7 (934). It would seem, how-
ever, that an organized society cannot allow the performance of this citizenship obliga-
tion to rest solely within the discretion of its individual members.
Legislation providing for optional military training in land grant colleges may be a
possible way to make provision for conscientious objectors. 36 Ops. Atty. Gen. U.S.
297 (193o); i Idaho L. Rev. 9o (1931); though it has been suggested that even this
method is not available. Johnson, Military Training in Land Grant Colleges: Is it
Optional or Mandatory? 24 Ill. L. Rev. 271 (1929).
Corporations-Power of Corporation To Acquire Its Shares-Voting Privileges of
Prior Preference Shareholders-[Virginia].-The capital structure of a corporation con-
sisted of shares of $ioo par value 7 per cent cumulative dividend prior preference stock,
$ioo par value 6 per cent cumulative participating preferred stock, and no par common
stock. By charter provision, so long as the prior preference stock outstanding should
be in excess of $io,ooo,ooo par amount, the holders of such stock were to have the
right, voting separately as a class, to elect a majority.of the board of directors of the
corporation. The charter also provided: (i) that the board of directors could redeem
all or part of such stock on payment of $i1o per share, plus unpaid dividends, such
shares to be cancelled and not to be reissued; (2) that a sinking fund be set up out of
the net earnings for the preceding year for the purpose of retiring such stock. Pursuant
to authority, given by the board of directors, the corporate officers had purchased "for
investment" enough prior preference stock at prices below par to reduce the total
amount held by the public to a figure considerably below $io,ooo,ooo, and the corpora-
tion now holds such shares in its treasury. At an annual meeting the majority of the
board of directors was elected by prior preference shareholders though less than $io,-
ooo,ooo of shares were outstanding and entitled to vote. Plaintiff, owner of 4oo shares
of preferred stock, was granted an order restraining the newly elected board from ex-
ercising its duties on the ground that the election was invalid because the purchase of
prior preference stock by the corporation had reduced the amount outstanding below
$io,ooo,ooo par amount. Held, on appeal, that the injunction be dissolved because the
purchase of the prior preference shares adversely affected a substantial right of such
shareholders, which could not be extinguished except by compliance with charter pro-
visions. Kemp et al. v. Levinger, 174 S.E. 820 (Va. 1934).
On the court's interpretation of the charter, the prior preference shareholders could
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be deprived of their privilege of electing the majority of the board of directors Only by
the following procedures: (i) by redemption of prior preference stock below $io,ooo,-
ooo, in which event the shareholder would be entitled to receive $iio per share re-
deemed; (2) by purchase of a like amount of stock out of sinking fund moneys; (3) by
amendment of the charter. The first two methods deal with acquisition of prior prefer-
ence shares and since they are the only methods provided for by which the prior prefer-
ence shares could be retired, the court concluded, that the enumeration of certain
methods excluded the power of the corporation to purchase under any other. The
court acceded to the general rule permitting purchase 'of a corporation's own shares
out of surplus; Boggs v. Fleming et al., 66 F. (2d) 859 (C.C.A. 4th 1933), affg. In re
Boggs-Rice Co., 4 F. Supp. 431 (D.C.Va. 1933); Kennerly v. Columbia Chemical Co.,
137 Va. 240, rig S.E. 265 (X923); but decided that the principal case fell within the
exception that such may not be done where "substantial rights of the stockholders"
would be adversely affected. Price v. Pine Mountain Iron & Coal Co., 32 S.W. 267 (Ky.
x895); Murphy Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Skaggs, 67 Utah 487, 248 Pac. 127 (1926). See
Gipson v. Bedard, 173 Minn. 104, 217 N.W. 139 (1927). The court, moreover, referred
to a "substantial right," implied by the charter, prohibiting purchases except for per-
manent retirement and out of sinking fund moneys. The existence of the retirement
and sinking fund provisions would seem a weak basis for this implication.
Another argument sustaining the conclusion of the court is that the clause, con-
ferring the right to elect a majority of the directors "so long as the prior preference
stock outstanding shall be in excess of $ro,oooooo," does not contemplate that the
election rights shall be suspended during the time that the corporation holds the shares.
But see Walsh v. State, 199 Ala. 123, 74 So. 45 (1917); Ruffner v. Sophie Mae Candy
Corp., 35 Ga. App. 114, 132 S.E. 396 (1926). If this viewpoint is correct, treasury
shares must be considered "outstanding" for the purpose of the clause, which is con-
trary to the generally accepted meaning of the word "outstanding." Borg v. Interna-
tional Silver Co., ii F. (2d) 147 (C.C.A. 2d 1925).
Furthermore, a reasonable construction would seem to be one giving to the word
"outstanding" its usual meaning as not including treasury shares, and also to construe
the words "so long as" to mean "so long as and whenever." This construction would
negative the right of the prior preference preferred stock to control the board of direc-
tors as long as the shares are held in the treasury, and would seem to leave little basis
for the court's implication that the charter provision limited the power of the corpora-
tion to acquire prior preference shares.
The management, elected by prior preference shareholders, is apparently trying to
get the benefit of reducing the outstanding prior preference shares at a favorable price
while preserving their control of the corporation.
Elections-Constitutional Law-Conviction of Felony as Disqualification from
Office-[North Dakota].-Defendant, governor of North Dakota, was convicted of a
felony in the Federal court. On quo warranto proceedings to remove him from office
the state court held, that although an appeal was pending and the offense was only a
misdemeanor under the state statutes, the defendant was under a disability to hold
office since the constitution required the governor to be a qualified elector and provided
that any person "convicted of felony unless restored to civil rights" was not qualified
to vote. State ex rel. Olson, v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377 (N.D. 1934).
